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I. INTRODUCTION
Both sides of the Brexit campaign were very nationalist in their
outlook suggesting that profitable preservation of a capitalist economy was
paramount based on a conservative sense of nationalism and sovereignty.1
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1.
John Browne, U.K.’s Minister Commits to Successful Brexit, TOWNHALL FINANCE
(August 5, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/johnbrowne/2016/08/05/U.K.sprime-minister-commits-to-successful-brexit-n2201876; see also Danica Kirka, U.K. Central Bank Tries
to Soften Brexit Shock on Economy, AP: THE BIG STORY (August 4, 2016, 1:24 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1f1f6bc759e945f0b366f5c7e4b74cdc/U.K.-central-bank-help-economythrough-brexit-stimulus.
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The ongoing debates concerning the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) future
relationship with the European Union (EU) continue amidst the rapid
cabinet changes and the political rhetoric of newly appointed U.K. public
officials.2 The post-Brexit campaign analysis shows that both the Leave
(Brexit) and Remain campaign relied on widespread publicly disseminated
negative scare tactics rather than on positive arguments for solidarity or for
sharing in support of each respective side on the actual issues. Both sides
were rigidly nationalistic in their outlook, relentless in their agnosticism of
the facts, and persistent in demonizing the opposition.
Analysis of voters’ demographics and news-consuming habits offer
potential clues as to why Brexit passed:3 Those who supported Brexit were
While cheaper money will help households and companies, the cost of loans is
already very low and is not their primary concern right now, economists say.
Businesses in particular are worried about whether to make investments or hire in
Britain without knowing what the country’s trade relationship with the EU will
be.
Nives Dolsak & Aseem Prakash, Here’s What Many Journalists Missed When Covering the
Brexit Vote, WASH. POST (August 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/08/04/heres-what-many-journalists-missed-when-covering-the-brexit-vote/
(Welfare
states have policies that help free trade’s losers. The political scientist John Ruggie called this system
for cushioning blows from the international economic system “embedded liberalism” arguing that the
interventionist domestic welfare state made possible today’s liberal trade order. But these kind of
policies are eroding. Winners aren’t compensating losers. In fact, firms like Apple that have gained
enormously from globalization are using complex financial arrangements to escape taxes. Wealthy
individuals are doing the same. Economic inequality is increasing dramatically in a “winner-take-all”
society. Mainstream media coverage that focuses on racism and xenophobia rather than economic loss
and inequality may not be taking these shifts adequately into account. Larry Summers famously insisted
in 2005 that financial markets cannot fail. Yet more recently he noted the Brexit vote should be a
‘wake-up call for elites everywhere’ on the need to ‘design an approach, approaches to economic policy
that hear the anger that’s being expressed in this vote.’” The real issue in BREXIT was “what did the
British average voter get, when and how from EU integration?”).
2.
See United Kingdom, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated July 28, 2016)
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/United_Kingdom (explaining that the United Kingdom is
constituted, or composed of four constituent governmental entities, England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland which together make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain. With the Brexit vote
now, this governance arrangement would continue as one nation State or if the arrangement would be
discontinued for the U.K., internally as several sovereigns. This article presupposes this arrangement
will continue. If it were discontinued, then it must be presumed that the United Kingdom would, as a
unit of governance, have to dissolve into these constituent governmental entities which then, in turn,
would either become independent nation-states in their own right and elect to join the EU, or else
reconfigure a different and perhaps new arrangement with “Mother Britannia.”).
3.
Will Youmans, The Brexit Vote and the Crisis of Sovereignty, GULF NEWS (June 25, 2016,
5:19 PM), http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-brexit-vote-and-the-crisis-of-sovereignty-1.1852328
(Brexit is a sort of martyrdom in the name of a restored state sovereignty. This is
of course a matter of perception. How much sovereignty did Great Britain
actually sacrifice? Euro-sceptics trotted out a litany of grievances, often to mock
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older and as a general observation, less educated formally. Brexit voters
tended to earn less money and where significant numbers appeared to work
in non-skilled trades, many lacked formal job qualifications. In other
words, these voters were not able to compete in a global economy that had
“trickled down into” the U.K. over the last forty years.4 According to some
reports, these voters appeared to be reluctant to adapt to rapid social
changes that integration into the global economy often requires as domestic
markets shift rapidly.5 Domestic labor markets and work opportunities
the over-specificity of EU regulations. It would be hard to accept that the U.K.’s
fate was actually much worse or unable to navigate the global economy as a result
of its belonging. Those mystified by the vote show contempt for the Brexit
decision. Some deride it as a demonstration of one of the major shortcomings of
democracy, namely when uninformed electorates make crucial decisions which
affect those to be governed. Referenda are among the most democratic means of
direct, collective decision-making. There are rightful concerns that public
deliberation beforehand was confused, media coverage was agnostic to facts, and
mistrust of expertise was absent. Either way, Brexit produced a confused desire
by the majority of Brits for fortifying state sovereignty. It will not fix the
underlying problems of economic stratification, withered public safety nets and a
national pride injured by its lost investments in imperialism and colonization.
The State model in general has failed to address the increasingly transnational
problems of the world today, including a growing global economic inequality,
mass migration, climate change and the whimsical destruction wrought by the
transnational finance networks. It is easy to pin these on the institutions like the
EU, but many border-defying problems are the direct result of past State
actions—the same powers of national sovereignty Brexit supporters seek to
bolster.”).
4.

Id.
(the neoliberal premise of free trade bringing about wealth creation for all did not
manifest. Ordinary working people are left to feel they paid the cost of U.K.
national honor—of which the State is the protector—for questionable, partial,
material benefits, which were disproportionately distributed to those who were
already well-off. The riches of Brussels went to those who profit the most from
trade, banking, finance and so on. Social and economic stratification has such
reproductive tendencies, and only further cement resentment. The rising sense of
national pride, one ridden by angst about the state of the changing world, might
appear irrational. But it betrays the underlying reason. An observer might miss it
if they value the outcome in economic terms and political outcomes alone).

5.
S.A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Rights Seriously After the Debt Crisis, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.
REV. 713 (2011); see generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2011); MURRAY MILGATE & SHANNON
C. STIMSON, AFTER ADAM SMITH: A CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATION IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); PAUL KRUGMAN, TRADE AND WAGES RECONSIDERED
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008); PHILLIP MCMICHAELS, DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE (Sage Pub.
2008); PETER NOLAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM:
THE CONTRADICTORY CHARACTER OF
GLOBALIZATION (Anthem Press 2008); INO ROSSI, FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH:
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Springer Pub. 2008); RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL
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change because of decisions made in corporate boardrooms rather than by
national legislatures and in parliament through a democratic and public
debate process. Brexit voters had concluded they were being left behind by
both the economic pressures and the social ramifications [e.g., immigration
mandates] of U.K.’s European Union membership.6 Adding up these
interconnected demographics, it is not difficult to understand that Brexit
reflected a larger, more deep-seated citizen angst about the fragile state and
legitimacy of U.K. sovereignty.
The public perceptions that influenced the urban Brexit voting patterns
carried with it some immediate and interesting mandates, not the least of
which will be substantive in terms of addressing U.K. security followed
shortly thereafter by significant internal planning and parliamentary review
of the U.K.’s sovereign obligations that accompany its global contractual
partnerships, Common Market participation, international trade agreements,
and international treaties on human rights.7 Transition in how exactly the

RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); RONALD FINDLAY &
KEVIN O’ROURKE, POWER AND PLENTY: TRADE, WAR AND THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE SECOND
MILLENNIUM (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); BARRY K. GILLS & W. R. THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION
AND GLOBAL HISTORY (Routledge 2006); JOHN BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM
(Yale Univ. Press 2005); CHAMSY EL-OJEILE & PATRICK HAYDEN, NEW CRITICAL THEORIES OF
GLOBALIZATION (Palgrave MaCmillian 2006); JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN 2005); JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL & NIELS PETERSSON,
GLOBALIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY (DONA GEYER, TRANS.) (Princeton Univ. Press 2009); RICHARD
H. ROBBINS, GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THE CULTURE OF CAPITALISM (Pearson 3d ed. 2005); ROBBIE
ROBERTSON, THE THREE WAVES OF GLOBALIZATION: A HISTORY OF DEVELOPING GLOBAL
CONSCIOUSNESS (Zed Books 2002); BARRY SMART, ECONOMY, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY: A
SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF NEO-LIBERALISM (Open Univ. Press 2003); JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Norton 2003); PETER A. HALL & DAVID W. SOSKICE,
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (Oxford Univ. Press
2001); MARTIN KOHR, RE-THINKING GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES (Zed
Books 2001); MOHAMMED A. BAMYEH, THE ENDS OF GLOBALIZATION (Univ. of Minnesota Press
2000); DEAN BAKER, GERALD EPSTEIN, & ROBERT POLLINS, GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSIVE
ECONOMIC CHANGE (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998); CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION:
STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (Rowman & Littlefield Pub. 1998); JOHN M. KEYNES, GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (Create Space Indep. Pub. Platform 2011).
6.

7.

Youmans, supra note 3.
(sovereignty is the passionate almost personal concern of nationalists, patriots and
ordinary citizens everywhere. The notoriously irresponsible British tabloids
agitated for such sentiments over the past four decades. Sovereignty, as the
highest political authority, was a key word in the Brexit debate, especially for
those calling for Leave votes. This is odd. What does national sovereignty mean
for average people who have no command of the state’s instruments and are not
of an economic class to determine how the state works? This presumes a rational
basis).
Id.
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U.K. plans to meet these global mandates will simultaneously raise
considerable domestic pressure by U.K. citizens for more elected official
transparency as the State reviews how it proposes to integrate its available
capital resources [both public and private] once the U.K. begins to function
outside its EU partnership.8
After almost a half-century of being part of a different vision, the U.K.
now plunges into a new period of political transition, uncertainty, and
public contestation. But now, the necessity of securing legitimacy with its
own citizens, U.K. lawmakers and public officials are confronted with
somehow redefining the operation of U.K.’s sovereignty while they
simultaneously negotiate an amicable EU separation and divorce settlement
under Article 50.9 The operative mandates for this “re-legitimization”
(the bargain underpinning the EU is that compromises in national sovereignty
through accession to regulatory compliance will bring economic and social
benefits. Creating a common economic market that could rival the American
economy would be a boost to lift all boats. Yet while greater access to markets
and labor migration accelerated within the EU, public austerity measures
produced cutbacks in domestic-level social programs, education and health.
These public austerity measures are now at the forefront of domestic political
review. For many working people, the benefits of EU membership did not appear
to outweigh the stagnation in quality of life they experienced, combined with the
loss of security).
8.
Steven Swinford, Theresa May Pledges to Fight Injustice and Make Britain ‘A Country
That Works For Everyone’ In Her First Speech as Prime Minister, THE TELEGRAPH (JULY 13, 2016,
8:53 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.U.K./news/2016/07/13/theresa-mays-pledges-to-fight-injustice-andmake-britain-a-count/.
(BREXIT supporters continually cited a number of reasons for leaving the EU
including independence and injuries to British national pride that Brussels
routinely imposed on the United Kingdom so much so that this over-regulation
from outside the borders of Great Britain appeared to prioritize foreign corporate
interests while forcing Britain to take particular refugees, especially from Syria
and Eastern Europe, that created a general fear about cultural and religious
disharmony).
(note that these essential capital resources are currently available to the U.K. as its rights and
benefits of EU membership but will need to be analyzed and carefully discussed precisely because the
public spectrum of Brexit citizen political demands are significant and dominantly focused on creating
measurable and concrete domestic-based solutions that address access to education, employment and
healthcare).
9.
See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, http://www.lisbontreaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-European-union-and-comments/
title-6-final-provisions/137-article-50.html [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (noting that any Member State
may decide to withdraw from the Union [EU] in accordance with its own constitutional requirements so
long as the Member State notifies the European Council of its intention. This notice triggers a set of
guidelines from the European Council to negotiate an agreement with that State for arrangements of the
withdrawal and is to also take into account the framework for the future relationships of that State with
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process is reflected in the Brexit vote by U.K. citizens who somehow felt
that British sovereignty was manipulated, bruised, or perhaps even
surrendered unnecessarily.
A brief glimpse into the political enormity of this transition for the
U.K. appeared in the early statements by the new Prime Minister Theresa
May. May essentially provided reassurances that she would heal the
nation’s divisions and build bridges to help the least privileged. She
publicly stated that her government would deliver Brexit and refocus its
priorities on people whose needs were greatest: “[w]hen we make the big
calls we will think not of the powerful but you,” she said. “When we pass
new laws, we will listen not to the mighty but to you. When it comes to
taxes, we will prioritize not the wealthy but you. When it comes to
opportunity, we won’t entrench the advantages of the fortunate few—we
will do everything we can to help anybody, whatever your background, to
go as far as your talents will take you.”10 Obviously, with the Brexit vote
the EU. The final agreement must have majority approval of the European Council members and the
consent of the European Parliament. The Treaties between the parties cease from the date of entry of
the negotiated agreement (Article 218(3) or failing an agreement, two years after Article 50 notification
is given by the State, unless the European Council unanimously decides to extend this time period.); see
also Nick Barber, ET AL., Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role, U.K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASSOC. (June 27, 2016), https://U.K.constitutionallaw.org/2016/06/27/nickbarber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/
(arguing that the Prime Minister alone is unable to trigger withdrawal from the EU under TEU; Prime
Minister must be authorized to do so by statute in order that the declaration is legally effective under
domestic law and complies with the preconditions of triggering Article 50); Miranda Butler, The
Implications of Brexit: Who Is Sovereign Now?, SOLICITORS JOURNAL (July 26, 2016),
http://www.3harecourt.com/assets/asset-store/file//MBBrexitSJ.pdf (discussing what Brexit vote entails
for U.K. parliamentary sovereignty and for U.K. influence in international issues; considers whether
U.K. constitutional law requires not only government’s use of ‘crown prerogative’ but also a
parliamentary vote in favor of leaving EU; looks like increased participation of Scotland and Northern
Ireland in U.K. decision making and future of U.K. as sovereign State in international law; citing case
R. v Secretary for the Home Department EX.P Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 A.C.513, Independent
[April 6, 1995]).
10.
Toby Helm, Theresa May’s First Pledge as PM Was for A “One-Nation Britain.” Can
She Deliver?, THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2016, 6:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/
jul/16/theresa-may-one-nation-britain-prime-minister (suggesting that the core problem is that, as yet, no
one in it [new British cabinet] knows what Brexit means, and what it will entail. May’s cabinet is split
between the likes of Hammond, who insists that whatever happens the U.K. must retain as much access
to the single market as possible, and others, such as Davis and Johnson, who seem to believe the U.K.
can thrive outside the single market if it has to, and this is the price the country has to pay to extricate
itself from the EU’s commitment to free movement of labor in order to control immigration); see
Swinford, supra note 8 (noting that Theresa May has directly addressed working-class Britons who are
"just managing" to cope with life as she vowed that her Government will not "entrench the advantages
of the privileged few." In a searing speech outside Downing Street May pledged to "fight against the
burning injustices" of poverty, race, class and health and give people back "control" of their lives; she
vowed to "prioritise" tax cuts and legislation for working-class voters rather than the "mighty"; Her
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behind her government, Theresa May will be in a unique position to foster a
more structured plan that intentionally re-defines the role and function of
State government within its overall domestic operation.11
Her early comments suggest there will be a quasi-public debate that
takes a long view and will be framed by widespread domestic program
development. May speaks of marshalling various capital resources and
domestic programs around economic marketplace issues, social safety
networks, labor issues, job creations, and individual capability development
as the country strives to fight against burning social injustices. The balance
espoused by Ms. May points to a much more deliberate approach in the
State’s development and utilization of economic capital,12 social capital,13

speech, setting out her vision as a "One Nation conservative”, marked a clear attempt to distance herself
from David Cameron's premiership and appeal directly to disenchanted Labour voters. She said that for
an "ordinary working class family" life is "much harder than many people in Westminster realise" as she
sought to heal the national divide after the EU referendum. Her speech highlighted her clear intention to
reach out to Labour voters who feel alienated by Jeremy Corbyn in a move which could put the Tories
in power for a decade. After arriving in Downing Street, May said that her "mission" as Prime Minister
will be to make Britain "a country that works for everyone". She also vowed to “forge a bold new
positive role” for Britain outside the European Union).
11.
See Karen A. Cecilia O’Rourke, The Crossroads of Globalization, Human Rights, and
Rule of Law: Creating A Legal Culture of Human Rights Designing A Geonomos Model for the State
(2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Washing College of Law, American University) (on file with
the American University Library system) (the irony of Brexit as a historical event, is that contrary to
public anecdotal comments that Theresa May is a “new Thatcher”, Prime Minister May is thankfully not
Margaret Thatcher, and hopefully does not feel compelled to bear the Thatcher political standard.
Recall that it was Margaret Thatcher [U.K.] and Ronald Reagan [U.S.A.] who created, embraced and
implemented the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010] for global capitalism [better known as “trickledown economics” or The Washington Consensus] which has proven to be disastrous to State
sovereignty, domestic program funding, and State oversight of the private sector capital movement both
in domestic markets and in the global economy).
12.
See Glyn Holton, Economic Capital, GLYN HOLTON (August 11, 2016),
https://www.glynholton.com/notes/economic_capital/. (economic capital is the quantum of risk capital,
assessed on a real basis, which an enterprise requires to cover the risks that it is running or collecting as
a going concern, such as market risk, credit risk, legal risk, and operational risk) (it is the amount of
money which is needed to secure survival in a worst-case scenario. Firms and financial services
regulators, i.e., representing the nation-state should then aim to hold risk capital of an amount equal at
least to economic capital. Typically, economic capital can be calculated by determining the amount of
capital that a firm needs to ensure that its realistic balance sheet stays solvent over a certain time period
with a pre-specified probability. Therefore, economic capital is often calculated as value at risk. The
balance sheet, in this case, would be prepared showing market value (rather than book value) of assets
and liabilities and thus economic capital is distinguished in relation to other types of capital which may
not necessarily reflect a monetary or exchange-value. These forms of capital include natural capital,
cultural capital and social capital, the latter two represent a type of power or status that an individual can
attain in capitalist society via a formal education or through social ties. O’Rourke, supra note 11, at
278–79).
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and human capital14—three essential resources that every nation State
including the U.K. already possesses. The post-Brexit appeal made by May
seeks to shape a different foundation for the twenty-first century U.K. as
she speaks about a social contract between government and those it seeks to
govern that represents a more flexible continuum for State sovereignty—
one that secures public decision-making, individual liberty, citizen
opportunity and economic stability. Every one of these espoused efforts
moves the public debate for defining the operative scope of British
sovereignty on to a twenty-first century continuum—a continuum that is
more relational in the domestic sector and more actively functional in the
international sector. It is an effort that strives to meet the modern demands
13.
See Paul S. Adler ET AL., Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept, 27 THE ACAD. OF
MGMT. REV., 17–40 (2002), http://www.csee.wvu.edu/~xinl/library/papers/social/social_capital.pdf (the
term Social Capital generally refers to (a) resources, and the value of these resources, both tangible
(public spaces, private property) and intangible ("actors," "human capital," persons and people) but is in
the GeoNOMOS© to be distinguished from human capital, (b) the relationships among these resources,
and (c) the impact that these relationships have on the resources involved in each relationship, and on
larger groups. The focus of social capital is generally as a form of capital that produces public goods for
a common good); see also P. BOURDIEAU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRAC. (Cambridge University
Press, 1972); L.J. HANIFAN, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
POL. AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 130–138 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1916); L.J. HANIFAN, THE COMMUNITY
CENTER (Boston: Silver Burdett & Company, 1920); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AM. CITIES 138 (Random House Inc.,1961) (stating that “If self-government in the place is to work,
underlying any float of population must be a continuity of people who have forged neighborhood
networks. These networks are a city's irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from
whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new capital is slowly and
chancily accumulated.”); James Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J.
OF SOCIOLOGY SUPPLEMENT S95–S120 (1988), http://courseweb.ischool.illinois.edu/~katewill/forchina/readings/coleman 1988 social capital.pdf; Barry Wellman & Scott Worley, Different Strokes from
Different Folks: Community Ties and Social Support, 96 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 558–88 (1990),
http://www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Wellman%20and%20Wortley%20-%201990%20%20Different%20Strokes%20from%20Different%20Folks%20Community%20.pdf; Samuel Bowles &
Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community Governance, 112 THE ECON. J. 419–36,
http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/SocialCapital.pdf.
14.
See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87(3) Q. J. OF ECON. 355–74 (1973),
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirkb/teach/pdf/spence/1973%20job%20market%20signalling.pdf (human
capital is a term popularized by Gary Becker, an economist from the University of Chicago, and Jacob
Mincer that refers to the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes, including
creativity, embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value. In the alternative,
human capital is understood as a collection of resources—all the knowledge, talents, skills, abilities,
experience, intelligence, training, judgment, and wisdom possessed individually and collectively by
individuals in a particular and defined population. Such resources are the total capacity of the people
that represents a form of wealth which can be directed to accomplish the goals of the nation or state or a
portion thereof); see also Michael Spence, Signaling in retrospect and the Information Structure of
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434–59 (2002), http://classes.maxwell.syr.edu/ecn611/spencenobel.pdf;
Gary Becker, Human Capital, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (September 29, 2016),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html.

2016]

Eghbal & O’Rourke

9

of the nation State without a retrenchment to an older view of an absolute
sovereign autonomy of the Westphalian model of the nation State that
prevailed before and after World War II. As a recognized global leader, the
U.K. is in an unusual position in the next few years to design this new
continuum of sovereignty and to model its operation both domestically for
its citizens and internationally with a more effective set of economic
organizing principles that balance the ongoing global expansion of
capitalism.
II. WHY A NEW TYPOLOGY FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY?
The world in relation to the operation of sovereign States has changed
dramatically in the last half of the twentieth century as demonstrated by the
end of traditional colonialism—de jure, if not also de facto—and the sheer
number of newly emerging nation States claiming and being accorded
sovereignty.15 Traditional notions of sovereignty established by the Treaty
of Westphalia (1648)16 are simply no longer fully applicable or realistic as
the State legitimizes its function in the twenty-first century. States,
including the U.K., have voluntarily agreed to cooperate in the interests of
global capitalism, human rights, and world peace across a variety of global
partnerships by signing charters, private and public sector investment
contracts, and a wide variety of public treaty agreements.17 As a result, a
recognizable and functional international “community of States” has been
established and the U.K. is fundamentally a part of that community in
addition to its membership in the EU regional configuration of States; a
community which it cannot “leave,” no matter what, but a community
which it may be able to influence and re-shape more productively and going
forward in time through more active and engaged participation.
Furthermore, as global economic organizing principles have also
changed over time, the ongoing function of State sovereignty was altered
even into the early twenty-first century.18 As part of this dynamic process,
dominant States such as the U.K., continued to give up parts of the
traditional scope of State sovereignty in exchange for what was perceived

15.

See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11.

16.
See Treaty of Westphalia, YALE L. SCH. (August 15, 2016), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
17th_century/westphal.asp (the Treaty of Westphalia originally was signed in 1648 to stop the religious
wars of the seventeenth century by securing a domestic jurisdiction and a defined geographic boundary
for emerging nations, thus offering protection for nation States); O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 236; Aloun
A. Preece, The Rise and Fall of National Sovereignty, 8 INT’L TRADE AND BUSINESS L. REV. 229
(2003),http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/IntTBLawRw/2003/9.html.
17.

See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 9, 11.

18.

See generally O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 2.
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as the ongoing mutual benefits of these economic market partnerships in
both the public and private international arena.19
The idea that how sovereign States conduct themselves is a dynamic
phenomenon in constant flux requires a parallel consideration that there will
be another set of transitions required in this century as the defined role,
legitimacy, responsibility and operational function of a sovereign State
continues to change. The changing global realities of the last forty years
point to the evolution of a continuum of State sovereignty for this century,
one that coordinates cooperation both in addressing the legitimacy of its
citizen’s concerns and in designing a new global market paradigm.
As nation States entered the early twenty-first century, two
predominant debates ensued. The first debate included a cadre of global
politicians and world order scholars arguing that the dominance of
international organizations and their scope of authority meant the nation
State was “dead.” World governance would soon become inevitable in a
cosmopolitan sense of global political and legal evolution.20 Traditional
notions about State sovereignty would simply merge into a world
governance model. Others suggested that State was not dead but would
remain a viable architect of world order well into the twenty-first century.21
The second debate presented new typologies for State sovereignty
suggesting an evolution in the expression of State sovereignty was
emerging.
This second debate relied on State collaboration and
19.
See Understanding the WTO Basics, WORLD TRADE ORG. (September 29, 2016),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (the basis of a “common law of
humanity” emerged after the end of the Cold War in the 1980s followed the emergence of independent
States in Eastern Europe who were active in the United Nations and demanded equity and fair access
into the global marketplace and international finance as well. The World Trade Organization was
created in 1995 as an evolution of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariff and Trade of 1948.
These global trading contractual agreements between States coupled with many regional trade
agreements in the late twentieth century continued to erode the Westphalian notion of an absolute form
and unilateral expression of State sovereignty. However, while cooperative behavior increased between
sovereign States and seemingly eroded the authoritarian and more traditional Westphalian model of
sovereignty, the endorsement of equality among sovereign States is also foundational to the United
Nations Charter and other global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the World Trade Organization); see O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 82, 237.
20.
See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard University Press, 2000); see
also Peter Hay, Supranational Organizations and United States Contract Law, 6 VA. J. INT’L L. 195
(1996); Patrick Tangrey, The New Internationalism: The Cessation of Sovereign Competency to Supernational Organizations and Constitution Changes in U.S. and Germany, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 395 (1996);
HAROLD JONES, INT’L MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRETTON WOODS (2000) (explaining how IMF
as one international organization has loan terms requiring a country engage in trade liberalization under
neoliberal paradigm as well as in various domestic budget and credit restraints); JEREMY RABKIN, LAW
WITHOUT NATIONS?: WHY CONS. GOV’T REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (Princeton University Press,
2005).
21.

See O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 343, 410–11.
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interdependence that would require a more interactive and relational
definition of how States expressed their sovereignty. New functional
typologies for the State could no longer simply be based on a traditional
Westphalian authoritarian exercise of unilateral power.22
In the last decades of the twentieth century, numerous
recommendations for a new sovereign State typology were presented. Jack
Donnelly proposed a new typology (a four sectioned rectangular box) that
balanced State authority and State capabilities with sovereign rule and the
State’s scope of domination as it intersected effective components of formal
sovereignty and material/normative weaknesses.23 Francis Deng and Helen
Stacey suggested two different typology arrangements for sovereignty as
responsibility24 and relational sovereignty.25 Deng’s typology analyzed a
range of both internal and external State factors and then, correlated these
factors with a new international standard of responsible sovereignty as an
irreversible process.26 Helen Stacey suggested that a new typology of
relational sovereignty was emerging where the sovereign would be judged
by how well and by what means the State concretely and continuously
“cares” for its people.27 A fourth typology by Julian Ku and John Yoo
discussed a popular sovereignty based on the idea that people in a sovereign
State govern themselves through Constitutional structures and institutions.28
22.
GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & N. WALKER, RELOCATING THE RULE OF L. (Hart, 2009); see
Rebecca Bratspies, Perspectives on the New Regulatory Era, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 (2009); see also Eric
Engles, Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); James
Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF GLOBALIZATION
RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES 307–15 (Inno Rossi ed., 2007); Elke
Krahmann, National Regional and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or Many?, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 323 (2003), https://stackofideas.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/national-regional-andglobal-governance-one-phenomenon-or-many-elke-krahmann.pdf; Brad Roth, The Enduring
Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Paul Kahn, The Question of
Sovereignty, 40 STAN J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); PAUL KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE
(Princeton University Press 2005); Clair A. Cutler, Critical Reflctions on the Westphalian Assumptions
of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 133 (2001);
MICHAEL FOWLER & JULIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge 1995) (for historical
notions of sovereignty); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS ONE AND TWO (Bobbs Merill Co., 18th
ed. 1958); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Books, 1st ed. 1968); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOV’T (Prentice-Hall, 1st ed. 1953).
23.
Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights 3–4 (June 2004) (forthcoming paper
prepared for working papers).
24.

Francis Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty, 8 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995).

25.

Helen Stacey, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 210 (2009).

26.

Deng, supra note 24, at 250–77.

27.

Stacey, supra note 25, at 218–22.

28.
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Bᴇʀᴋᴇʟᴇʏ J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 210, 211
(2013) (noting that sovereignty is in decline but the decline in national sovereignty is not desirable since
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In this construct, the State can legitimately share sovereign power with its
citizens without compromising the whole system.29
The typology presented in this article builds on concepts noted above
and points to yet another evolution in how sovereign States function in this
century. It is an interactive typology called a continuum for sovereignty,
one that is based on a framework of liberty and ensures the State remains
the primary architect of world order.30 The GeoNOMOS© operates
interactively on two levels as a State secures its legitimacy within a
geographic boundary for the very people it is trying to govern and then,
shapes the global market partnerships that it intentionally seeks to
undertake. [See diagram below]. This typology offers sovereign stability,
operational flexibility and addresses the two primary functional components
of any twenty-first century State, including the U.K.: (i) one component
redefines how the sovereign State functions to create and sustain a civil
society within its own domestic sphere (vertical axis) by addressing the
specific needs of its populations who will live and work most of their lives
within the geographic boundary of that State, and (ii) one component that
seeks to redefine how the sovereign State functions and engages within its
own international sphere (horizontal axis) by engaging with the public and
private sector global marketplace and foreign investment sector, public
sector international institutions, and an international community of States.31
State maintains decision-making and individual liberties. Suggesting a new form of popular sovereignty
with shift away from Westphalian models to the right for people to govern themselves through
institutions of the Constitution and its structures. Popular sovereignty is flexible to maintain national
sovereignty and assumes State can share sovereign power without giving up entire system; popular
sovereignty can co-exist with globalization and governance issues in ways that the rigidity of
Westphalian system could not. State turning automatically to international organizations inconsistent
with reliance and continued power of nation States; by referring to structural provisions of Constitution,
e.g, separation of powers, promotes state level democratic governance and incorporates the gains of
international cooperation).
29.

Id. at 218.

30.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 212 (noting a continuum is referenced as the basis of this new
typology for sovereignty because it represents a more flexible set of options given the range of
possibilities in terms of how an individual State interacts with some sense of legitimacy on behalf of the
people it is governing and interacts as a member of the international community of States; there is no
limit to the possibilities offered as part of this proposal for a continuum of State sovereignty so long as it
operates within a framework of liberty. See diagram and discussion detailed in this commentary. See
definition of continuum at http://merriam-webster.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2016)).
31.
Id. at 15 (stating without a doubt, the rapid and uncontrolled movement of private sector
global capital and public sector capital and domestic finances in and out a State’s legal boundaries also
bear witness to these relational components of State sovereignty within the international sphere of the
equation. The same flexibility of global movement never seemed to occur on the side of development or
utilization of social and human capital. While economic capital was and remains highly mobile and
unregulated, most human labor (human capital) is bound by State geographic boundaries and people’s
life circumstances and citizenship rights are dictated by those State boundaries. This is the domestic re-
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Often the functional role and legitimacy of State sovereignty lies
dormant until a conflict like Brexit emerges. Then the sovereign powers as
well as State legitimacy or State authority arise, are challenged, and need to
be redefined. As with the Brexit vote, these demands are now made not
upon a set of elected individuals but upon the U.K. in toto and acting as a
sovereign nation State. This legitimacy crisis cannot be ignored. In fact,
given the charged atmosphere around the Brexit vote, there appears to be a
growing sense of citizen entitlement just as the U.K. strives to determine the
proper balance of sovereign accountability for building a different kind of
civil society that May defines as “one Nation conservative” apart from the
European Union. An expanded level of U.K. legitimacy will need to secure
a new set of global market organizing principles that move beyond the
neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) notion of “trickle-down” global
economics.
The typology for a continuum of State sovereignty presented here
contributes to support this ongoing conversation concerning the post-Brexit
dialogue and the U.K. secession process by suggesting the premise that the
U.K. as a nation State must remain a primary architect in shaping not only
its own civil society but also in modeling a new world order for this
century. A civil society inspired by Prime Minister May will be more
economically inclusive, one hopefully based on a new paradigm for global
capitalism that does not leave large groups of U.K. citizens out of its
intended benefits; one that supports a sense of equity in sharing tax burdens
from all sectors within the State; and one that provides opportunity, access
to education and advancement in jobs for all.32

balancing that appears to be in demand as a result of Brexit vote in the U.K. and that is espoused by
Theresa May’s ideal of “one Nation conservative.” There is an imbalance expressed and experienced by
the U.K. citizenry active in the Brexit campaign that the benefits of economic capital development have
not trickled down to the social settings and human capital development in places where most U.K.
citizens live every day).
32.
Id. at 74–75 (this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global capitalism routinely
required tremendous State reductions in domestic program development, public services, and public
sector program funding as a calculated cost for continued access to global market development, foreign
direct investment programs, and participation in world financial institutions that provide necessary
access to public and private economic capital. Ms. May will be in a unique position to soften some of
the past structural damage done domestically in the U.K. by this neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) and
has a citizen mandate to do so now as evidenced by the Brexit vote—by her own statements, May
appears willing to address damages that have accumulated over time from the neoliberal economic
paradigm of the 1980s, the benefits from which apparently have not “trickled down” to regular U.K
citizens who in Brexit challenged State legitimacy and demanded broader State commitments to
domestic concerns, programs, and citizen quality of life issues. The balance that needs to be struck
between U.K.’s domestic program design and U.K.’s international obligations and global market
participation is daunting but possible to address if the underlying basis of U.K. sovereignty can be reconfigured prior to the completion of Article 50 negotiations on a transition agreement).
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Rodrik argues that the blind spot of the capitalist globalization process
in the neoliberal era (c.1980–2010) consisted of deep and rapid integration
in the world economy coupled with the idea that the required institutional
underpinnings could catch up later at the domestic level of the State.33
With respect to how (in what manner) the U.K. might develop and utilize
its considerable economic capital which is part of the proposed continuum
of State sovereignty, Rodrik supports a basic principle that markets always
require other social institutions (domestic level) to support legal
arrangements and global market stabilizing functions so there can be fair
redistribution, taxation, safety nets, and social insurance.34 As the U.K.
adjusts its legal arrangements and market functions in the post-Brexit
period, careful review of several basic principles could be beneficial in
several ways.
First, the singular neoliberal focus of the past era that relied on global
market development to support concentrated economic growth and/or to
secure private sector foreign direct investment inside the State should raise
caution in the U.K. as well given the widespread documentation of the
uneven implementation and results of the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–
2010) within the capitalist globalization process.35 This issue is evidenced
in the general dissatisfaction with notions of “trickle down” benefits to
U.K. citizens that have not predictably or consistently occurred and is
certainly one of the problems underlying the Brexit vote.
Second, Rodrik concludes a State has the right to protect its own
institutions, social arrangements, and regulations so that globalization
becomes an instrument for achieving the goals that a society seeks:
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life.36 It has been the uneven
33.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 231–42, 245 (discussing a dominant role for the nation State in
relation to the principles of democratic decision-making which is the foundation for the international
economic architecture; noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one
cannot presume a country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens); see
generally Mɪʟɢᴀᴛᴇ, supra note 5.
34.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 240 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the
goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life).
35.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 1 (The legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm [c.1980-2010]
for the globalization process has increasingly been challenged as the 2008 global recession continues
and as global financial institutions are still forced to wrestle with the regulatory boundaries of a global
market, the growing/ongoing financial and political instability of State governments (Greece, Italy,
Spain, Egypt, Ireland, Portugal and more), equity issues in the global political economy, and the
growing demands to create a more humane paradigm for capitalist globalization.).
36.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241 (setting out a series of statements in support of a State’s right
to protect their own social arrangements, regulations and institutions; and suggesting that trade is a
means to an end, not an end in itself so that globalization should be an instrument for achieving the
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application of the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010) that has tragically
limited State sovereignty in a variety of contexts as reflected in the U.K.
Brexit vote, and now will require a re-balancing process in terms of global
trade as a means to an end and not an end in and of itself.37 This rebalancing process within the U.K. points directly to a debate on its domestic
social arrangements and its use of globalization as a blunt tool to achieve
prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life. A structured but more
transparent internal U.K. functional review could witness a major nation
State prioritizing a new definition and role for State sovereignty in the
twenty-first century—a continuum for sovereignty operating within a
framework of liberty.
Third, the proposed GeoNOMOS© typology designs a single core
function for the State both in relationship: a) to its citizens (vertical axis)
from whom it seeks legitimacy in order to govern, and, b) to its engagement
in the global marketplace (horizontal axis) from an intentionally crafted
long term strategic and sustainability perspective. Applying the new
typology proposed here suggests that the U.K. would be better positioned to
develop a flexible Article 50 transition strategy and a new set of economic
organizing principles that consistently balance all the three capital resources
(economic, social and human capital) needed for the sustainability of the
State’s institutions, social arrangements, and State regulations.38

goals that a society seeks: prosperity, stability, freedom and quality of life); O’Rourke, supra note 11, at
279 (noting that when States are not democratic this scaffolding collapses and one cannot presume a
country’s institutional arrangements reflect the preference of its citizens; concluding that nondemocratic States must play by a different, less permissive set of rules in the global marketplace).
37.
Rᴏᴅʀɪᴋ, supra note 5, at 241; see generally Jᴏʜɴ Gʀᴀʏ, Fᴀʟꜱ ᴇ Dᴀᴡɴ: Tʜᴇ Dᴇʟᴜꜱ ɪᴏɴꜱ
ᴏꜰ Cᴀᴘɪᴛᴀʟɪꜱ ᴍ (1998) (providing a detailed step-by-step review and analysis from the State’s
perspective outlining how a neoliberal set of global economic organizing principles functioned to
destroy domestic level public sector budgets by transferring assets wholesale to the private sector as a
pre-condition for market access, locked out democratic legislative oversight through private sector
contracts, and more. These dramatic restructuring to align neoliberal constructs shifted priorities for
short term economic wealth not long term legal arrangements and market regulations that would support
nation States goals of fair distributions, taxation, safety nets and social insurance. In other words,
globalization was not a means to an end as Rodrik has suggested it should be, it was the end game—rule
of law chased after globalization instead of the other way around—A new emphasis re-balancing
process could design State level rule of law legal arrangements first, and out of that process, then
position the State to design a new set of economic organizing principles).
38.
Holton, supra note 12; Adler, supra note 13, at 17–40; BOURDIEAU, supra note 13;
HANIFAN, supra note 13, at 138; JACOBS, supra note 13, at 138; Coleman, supra note 13, at S95–S120;
Wellman, supra note 13, at 558–88; Bowles, supra note 13, at 419–36; Spence, supra note 14, at 355–
74, 434–59 (forms of Capital, in this commentary for references and very brief definitions of three
forms of capital noted in this new typology; this commentary suggests that every State has these three
forms of capital and the differences in how States define their function is directly related to the amount
of each form of capital that the State manages and oversees as a sovereignty entity).
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From the opening statements of Theresa May, it appears there will be
significant future emphasis on “one nation for all” and not just the rich and
powerful.39 There will be public and private resources and opportunity to
redefine how the State relates to its citizens in more concrete and practical
ways.40 It is the hypothesis of this article that all this, when and if it occurs,
can only occur and be successful within that which the GeoNOMOS© seeks
to describe below more fully and to define schematically. Embracing a
continuum of sovereignty based on a framework of liberty while working to
secure a single core function as the diagram outlines prior to completing
Article 50 negotiations, would provide the U.K. with the flexibility to
manage its political and economic risks within both its domestic sphere and
international sphere where the U.K. must continue to operate in this
century. This typology could embrace both the best of U.K. history and the
challenges of a workable EU exit strategy.41
39.
Theresa May’s Tory leadership launch statement: full text, INDEPENDENT (June 30,
2016),
http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/U.K./politics/theresa-mays-tory-leadership-launchstatement-full-text-a7111026.html.
40.
Id.; see generally O’Rourke, supra note 11 (in the tradition of political thought
sovereignty is conceived as a social contract. In democratic states both parties, the state on the one side
and its citizens on the other, are bound to this bargain. In return for giving up power to the State, as
citizens, we are conferred rights, which prevent States from abusing this power that we have given them.
This social contract, then, involves two parties—people the State seeks to govern and the State).
41.
See generally ANATOLE KALETSKY, CAPITALISM 4.0: THE BIRTH OF A NEW ECON. IN THE
AFTERMATH OF CRISIS (Public Affairs, 2010) (an extensive literature review has informed the
development of the proposed continuum of State sovereignty including the State’s single core functions
as outlined and its direct partnership with its people as part of the radical transformation of the twentyfirst century State. This cumulative literature search to support the creation of a continuum for State
sovereignty includes but is not limited to the following work); see Steven Menashi, Ethno-nationalism
and Liberal Democracy, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 57 (2012); GIANLUIGI PALOMBELLA & NEIL WALKER,
RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford Hart Publishing, 2009); Timothy William Waters, The
Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining: Annoying Westphalian Objections to the
Idea of Global Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2009); Peer Zumbansen, Law After the
Welfare State Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Relexive Law 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 796
(2008); IVAN MANOKHA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (Palgrave
2008); James Rosenau, Three Steps Toward a Viable Theory for Globalization, in FRONTIERS OF
GLOBALIZATION RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES (Inno Rossi ed.,
2007); SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION (W.W. NORTON, 2007); Eric Engles, The
Transformation of the International Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23 (2007); John Alan Coahan,
Sovereignty in a Postmodern World, 218 FLA. J. INT’L L., 907–08, 913 (2006); Tanja A. Borzel &
Thomas Risse, Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of International
Governance, in EDGAR GRANDE & LOUIS W. PAULY, COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING
POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (University of Toronto, 2005); Paul Kahn, The
Question of Sovereignty, 40 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 259, 260–68 (2004); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A
NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton University Press, 2004); Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of
State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004); Eric A. Engle, The Transformation of the International
Legal System: The Post-Westphalian World Order, 23 W. L. R. 23 (2004); Krahmann, supra note 19, at
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III. A CONTINUUM OF SOVEREIGNTY BASED ON LIBERTY
The GeoNOMOS© represents a graphic schematic depicting the next
evolution for State sovereignty because it differentiates three important
principles. One, it posits conceptually that for all human activity, enterprise
and undertakings at the level of the State, liberty represents the outer
boundary [dotted line box] of any and all such endeavors.42 Beyond this
framework of liberty nothing can, nor does exist, and all activity with the
State falls within the four corners of this frame defined by liberty as the
State’s outer boundary. Two, the GeoNOMOS© distinguishes, in contrast
to other models which seek to develop an economic/legal model, or some
other models for nation States from times long past, that the nation State
and the nation State alone can function as a legal guarantor. It alone can
vouchsafe liberty both toward the individual and also toward other nation
States and supranational organizations who operate with semigovernmental character. The nation State alone can hold supranational
organizations accountable to some form of law and legal process. It is the
nation State alone that can protect individual human rights against the
onslaught of global commerce and the overreach of global international and
inter-governmental networks. It is the nation State alone that can exercise
jurisdiction legitimately. Three, the GeoNOMOS© remains dynamic and
ever evolving through the intense interaction of three forms of capital (e.g.,
social capital, human capital and economic capital) as the single core
function and purpose of the nation State. It is the State consistently
functioning at the center of these three forms of capital that will secure a
balance between these three essential resources to the benefit of the
individual (those persons the State seeks to govern) as it stabilizes its
domestic function (vertical axis) and its international function (horizontal
axis). All of this activity occurs and is grounded within the framework of
liberty.43
323; see Richard Falk, Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia, 6 J. ETHICS 311, 320–45
(2002); A. Clair Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and
Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 REV. INT’L LAW STUD. 133 (2001); STEPHEN KRASNER,
COMPROMISING WESTPHALIA IN D. HELD & A MCGREW, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER
(Polity Press, 2000); Eric M. Ulsner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569 (2000);
MICHAEL FOWLER & J.M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN (Routledge, 1995); LESTER
THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM (Brealey Pub, 1996); James S. Coleman, Social Capital and the
Creation of Human Capital, AM. J. SOC. S. 95 (1988); Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J.
INT’L L. 20 (1948); JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (1932).
42.
O’Rourke, supra note 11, at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like
oppression, slavery, prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which
enables where freedom does not).
43.
Id. at 107 (in this typology, a failed nation-State can be described as a nation-station where
the boundaries of the three forms of capital have become disconnected, i.e., the nation-state has been
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Liberty is that quintessential element necessary in human existence
which is the fertile ground to allow the most productive, creative and
mutually beneficial human endeavors and interactions to flourish and to
bring benefits to all, and the absence of which tends to dampen the
manifold expressions of all those truths people collectively hold to be selfevident. It is grounded in the rule of law, to be distinguished from
freedom,44 and requires a steadfast juxtaposition and weighing of individual
and communal rights, benefits, obligations and privileges without which no
human civil society can function. In the GeoNOMOS©, the existence of
liberty further forms a steel-belt of support and reassurance to all of human
community and its guarantor can only be the nation State, for both
individuals and supra-national entities (international institutions and
transnational corporations) lack the necessary legitimacy to guarantee
liberty’s existence.
There is no doubt that liberty in this framework will be a highly
contested topic and hotly debated not unlike rule of law is, and it should be
so both nationally, regionally and transnationally.45 T.H. Green defines
liberty as the capacity to do things, not the mere absence of restraint and,
thus, liberty actively includes a moral value and certain social elements that
are enjoyed in common with others.46 While there is no agreement even
among the many schools of republican legal thought, liberty here is defined
primarily as non-domination by the State, and includes human rights, civic
virtue and the creation of a common good.47 These basic characteristics of
a liberal republican theory are incorporated within the GeoNOMOS© as
part of the participatory government, supported by an interventionist State
whose single core function continuously reflects and balances the
forced into one or the other circle, but cannot be in all three circles. More importantly, such a State has
become unable to keep and preserve the necessary areas of overlap between these three forms of capital.
An exemplification of a more successful nation State would be reflected by a highly dynamic and ever
evolving tri-circular area where the State exists at the core of these three overlap areas which it times
grow and at times shrink, but always remain connected throughout the passage of time based on other
socio-political and legal developments).
44.
Id. at 312 (to be distinguished as “freedom from” factors like oppression, slavery,
prejudice and racism, and from “Liberty” as the quintessential element which enables where freedom
does not).
45.

Id. at 365.

46.

Dᴀᴠɪᴅ MɪʟʟᴇƦ ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., Tʜᴇ LɪʙᴇƦᴛʏ RᴇᴀᴅᴇƦ, 23 (2006).

47.
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development and utilization of all its essential capital resources. This
participatory function at the core of the State includes a rule of law that
reflects the principles of mutual benefit, liberty and human dignity.
The proposed continuum of sovereignty reflects a social and highly
interactional process based in part on the Law Merchant in a society of
economic traders, and espouses that the ‘rule of law’ will have meaning
only from within the social context reflected by the interaction of
institutions, procedures, and values depicted at the core of the
GeoNOMOS© where the single core function of the State is secured and
secure.48 The social context of a liberty framework is intentionally created
to protect the continuum of sovereignty since there can be no State
legitimacy and no State-related activity conducted outside the framework of
liberty.
The manifestations or functioning of liberty are influenced by four
cornerstones: choice, capability and resource development, justice, and
equity, and by the constant and continuing interaction of three forms of
capital: economic, social, and human capital. These forms of capital are
found to exist in every form of human society, or human association, albeit
to differing degrees and at different levels of development, but can be
discerned and even measured to be present and functioning in a state of
association and in a state of flux.
From within this global framework of liberty and moving along this
continuum of State sovereignty, each State secures its single core function
(sovereign capacity) to manage a wide range of possibilities because all
domestic and international actors must also function within the State’s
framework of liberty.49 The framework of liberty is anchored by four
corners, two on the lower end of the diagram depicting equity and justice
and two on the upper end of the diagram depicting elements that support the
principle of human dignity—individual autonomy/choice and individual
capability/resource development (see diagram). It depicts an actual
relationship that can be measured along the continuum between the State
and the people it seeks to govern. This exists because quantitative
measurable outcomes for the qualitative work the State undertakes at its
single core function designs a more accountable and transparent expression
of its State sovereignty.
The continuum for sovereignty depicted systematically as the
GeoNOMOS© shows the U.K. at its single core function of the State
consistently balancing the essential three capital resources. The U.K.
already has possession of all these capital resources and it has the authority
and stability to engage with the integrated vision espoused by Prime
48.
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Minister May. The operational components of a continuum of sovereignty
align with the driving force behind the Brexit vote and point to a public
citizen mandate for the U.K. to secure “one Nation conservative” as
Theresa May has proposed.
The U.K. initiates this dynamic process with a thorough, hard-nosed,
and unvarnished review of all of its capital resources and the various stages
of development and utilization. It begins to secure an integrated single core
function for the State by subsequently combining with the principles of
liberty and human dignity to form a new typology which the GeoNOMOS©
represents. The continuum for sovereignty is designed to reflect more
accurately the nature, needed flexibility and new functionality for the U.K.
as it seeks to balance consistently its domestic role and its international role
within its Article 50 transition. The opportunity for the U.K. in modeling
this continuum of State sovereignty places emphasis on upholding the rule
of law so that economic and global market participation follow the law and
not the other way around where law chases after and reacts to economic
organizing principles.
The continuum for sovereignty proposed above also follows Rodrik’s
insight by suggesting that the State must simultaneously integrate and
balance all three forms of its essential capital resources as its single core
function as a matter of legitimacy.50 Functioning from within a framework
of liberty, the State operates along a vertical axis (representing U.K.’s
domestic function) and along a horizontal axis (representing U.K.s
international function) (see diagram). The U.K. is in a position to design
and implement a strategy for the post-neoliberalism era that supports its
domestic stability (vertical function) and its international market
participation (horizontal function).
In this manner, the U.K.’s single core function engages at the center of
three overlapping circles (three forms of capital) and the center of the
intersection of a vertical axis and a horizontal axis inside the GeoNOMOS©
Model.51 (See diagram attached). This single core function incorporates
three essential building blocks that belong to every nation State—economic
capital, social capital, and human capital—all of which must remain interconnected and continuously balanced in order for the State to maintain
legitimacy as sovereign as to its function.
A very brief explanation follows on these three essential building
blocks that form the State single core function. Economic capital can be
defined as the amount of risk capital assessed on a realistic basis which a
nation State requires in order to remain solvent over a period of time.
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Economic capital can be calculated.52 It is an open question whether
rigorous risk analysis is or can be a necessary and required function of
government. Yet, it can be reasonably presumed that it is part and parcel of
any and all economic and commercial enterprise.52 Governments have no
business to function and act as commercial enterprises just as much as
business and commercial enterprises lack and perhaps should lack the
legitimacy and authority to act and function as a government (quasigovernment).
Social capital is understood as a stock of resources that an individual
can control by how they invest their time in community organizations,
educational institutions, religious organizations and neighborhood
networks.53 It represents a form of trust and reciprocity that is developed
within social networks in any given culture. Economic capital and human
capital are also forms of capital but they are generally more fungible in the
sense that these two forms of capital are linked to private goods. Social
capital which has an individual characteristic tends to aggregate and
represents a collective or public good as part of a civil society. Human
capital is a hybrid consisting of both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
Human capital in this schematic focuses first and foremost on the individual
and, then, on how that individual reaches maximum levels of
capabilities/resource development and individual autonomy in order to
contribute to society in ways that the individual actually can choose to
develop his or her human capital.
If a State disconnects the economic capital function from the core
function of the development and utilization of human capital or social
capital, the State essentially implodes; it fails.54 Likewise, if a State
concentrates only on human capital development without a balanced
program for economic capital development and utilization, it is out of
balance and more likely than not, will also fail. The key parameter here is
52
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balancing the forms of capital within the framework of liberty because the
four corners of the liberty framework as described anchor the State in
perpetuity.
What might take place in conditions when all the three forms of capital
become disjointed and lose connection, instead of remaining interconnected
as the GeoNOMOS© model suggests that they are? In essence, we are
describing failure of a nation-State, although it is conceivable that, at times,
one form of capital may separate from the other two forms (even if
temporarily, and for a short or extended period of time).
When social capital dis-associates, the nation State ceases to function
as nation State, waste and attrition in every form tend to increase because of
a decrease in a common and shared consciousness for a collective or public
good. Such conditions tend to push human existence and with it the human
condition to the very fringes of human association (or, in this case,
disassociation) and all human activities whether driven by Individual
Choice, Capability and Resources, Justice, or Equity [all four corners which
are proposed as anchors for the framework of liberty] of the GeoNOMOS©
tend to be severely challenged and strained.
When economic capital disassociates, such disassociation usually
occurs at costs which can be quantified and measured, and the metrics
compared. Economic capital tends to be risk averse, but also riskdependent. When stress and strain bring about conditions of risk such that a
disassociation of economic capital occurs, we tend to speak of capital flight,
and because the entire global market place has evolved financially in a
global network also, money quietly can move at a blink of the eye and with
relative ease.55 The absence of money and economic capital tends to cause
markets to contract and the impact of heightened, unsustainable risk tends
to cause unrest, shortages and deprivation of every kind within a nation
State—such developments push the nation-State rather quickly to the brink
of complete, societal collapse beyond the framework designed to protect
liberty, choice, capability/resource development, justice, and equity.
Human capital is the realm where disassociation is perhaps felt the
most as the decline and absence of both quantitative and qualitative aspects
of this form of capital tend to cause humans to flee from strife, war, and
civil unrest to seek a chance at opportunity. It also affects citizens in States
who seek to re-define liberty and to re-establish a measure of functional
stability, to find job opportunities or new job skills through education, and
to re-build and sustain communities and social networks.
By definition, all three forms of capital as understood against the
backdrop of liberty are co-equal in value which can result in communal
activities from an aggregation of distinct individual pursuits. But without
55.
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community and social networks, the context for such activity fails and such
activity tends to become fragmented, opportunistic and focused inward at a
time when its focus ought to be outward, directed toward community and to
giving shape to such community for the benefit of protecting individual
rights.
The intentional and consistent integration and balance between all
forms of capital is required so State level public sector institutional
development and utilization reflects strong economic capital but also
simultaneously addresses aspects of social capital such as trust, mutual
benefit and reciprocity. This integration creates the continuum for State
sovereignty. The integration at the single core function of the State
operates in tandem with human capital and with mandates for individual
choice as well as individual capability/resource development, e.g.,
employment, education, human rights, and opportunity.
All these
interrelated factors are functionally and politically tied to the four anchors
of the framework of liberty.56
As noted earlier in this text, the neoliberal paradigm (c. 1980–2010)
developed so rapidly that it left many domestic level institutions unable to
maintain their functioning much less adapt to the rapid and crushing
changes that occurred in the global marketplace and in their domestic
economy. The continuum for sovereignty secures the operational role of the
State and from within its single core function, all capital resources remain
interrelated and interactive as well. Ongoing decision-making processes
made from within the core function of the State reflect issues from within
the domestic and international spheres (intersecting axis) of State activity
but are also secured within the framework of liberty in support of a rule of
law that secures justice, equity, and the principles of human dignity
[individual choice as well as capability/resource development]—the very
principles that Prime Minister May espouses in the Brexit transition.
The four anchors on the framework of liberty reflect a standard of
conduct that together support the principles of human dignity, reciprocity,
and mutual benefit. (See diagram attached). Finally, since it is axiomatic
in this Model that nothing can exist outside the framework of liberty, the
U.K. is in a very unique position in history to redefine how actors from
private and public sectors intersect with its national interests. In this
continuum of sovereignty, all actors, whether domestic or international,
private or public, must function from within the framework of liberty, and
all State and non-State actors must function in accordance with the conduct
standards that support the framework of liberty.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Now that Pandora’s Box has been opened, two dominant questions
have surfaced related to the post- Brexit aftermath:57 (i) What new form of
British sovereignty will be redefined, recreated, resurrected under its
negotiated Article 50 transition; and, (ii) What market form of economic
organizing principles for global capitalism will be advanced under the
banner of U.K.’s new form of sovereignty? In the U.K., where a nation
State seeks to address new levels of citizen frustration, public disapproval,
and civic engagement, the operational definitions from the 1940–1990s
regarding the legitimacy and the expression of national sovereignty are
outdated and perhaps no longer adequate for how the State must function in
the twenty-first century.
The complexity of U.K. inaugurating the actual secession process
through the invocation of Article 50 would hopefully reflect matters of best
practices and follow a structured period where a more transparent but
internal dialogue process, cost-benefit analysis, and necessary political
contestation had already occurred. The Brexit campaign itself cannot alone
fulfill this domestic-level dialogue process and planning obligation since it
was conducted mostly on the perceptions of people with a general
agnosticism of the facts. This interim transition period cannot merely be
about the shift in political parties at Downing Street either. It will need to
be a well-reasoned and detailed fleshing out of a political-legal and socioeconomic vision, one that is mapped out long before the secession
agreement package is negotiated by the U.K. and presented to the European
Council and European Parliament for approval.
If there is a positive light at the end of this tunnel for U.K. transition
under Article 50, it is the realization that the post-Brexit context is ripe for
the creation of a new twenty-first century continuum for State sovereignty.
The U.K. could choose not to fall back on the out-dated, but persistent
Westphalian notions of how a nation State “ought” to organize and operate
in the world today and step onto a continuum for State sovereignty based on
using all of its core capital resources to secure liberty. The U.K. could
intentionally move beyond the neoliberal paradigm (c.1980–2010) of global
capitalism by defining a more “humanizing” paradigm based on a new set
of economic organizing principles akin to those proposed by Rodrik and
others. In doing so, the U.K. steps forward as a world leader espousing a
framework of liberty that redefines and secures the single core function of
the nation State in the twenty-first century: to ensure participatory
democracy and individual rights.
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